

RELEASED IN FULL

P596

Tue Nov 14 15:08:18 1995

Page 1

/ / NODIS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FRP: , , 3 , , , ,

SPECAT

ACTION: NONE

INFO: FILE, STATDICT (2/W)

95 2288537* SCO

PAGE 001
TOR: 141745Z NOV 95

NC 2288537*
USUN N 04545

OO RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
TOU5795
OO RUEHC
DE RUCNDT #4545/01 3181534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141534Z NOV 95
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9081
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 004545

NODIS DECAPTIONED

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO U.S. DELEGATION IN DAYTON
AND USNATO

E.O.12356: DECL: 07/12/05
TAGS: PREL, UN, BK, UK, HR, SR,
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: USUN VIEWS ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE NOVEMBER
-- 13 AGREEMENT ON EASTERN SLAVONIA

1. CLASSIFIED BY MADELEINE K ALBRIGHT, AMBASSADOR
REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D)
2. (C) SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 12 AGREEMENT ON EASTERN
SLAVONIA CALLS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH A
"TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION" TO GOVERN THE REGION
DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF UP TO TWO YEARS, AND TO
AUTHORIZE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND
SECURITY AND HELP IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. FOR A
VARIETY OF REASONS SPELLED OUT BELOW WE MAY FIND IT TO
OUR ADVANTAGE TO USE THE UN TO SET UP BOTH THE
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
FORCE. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) THE NOVEMBER 12 AGREEMENT STATES THAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

CONFIDENTIAL

P596

Tue Nov 14 15:08:18 1995

Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

95 2288537* SCO

PAGE 002
TOR: 141745Z NOV 95

NC 2288537*
USUN N 04545

TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION WILL GOVERN THE REGION. IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, REESTABLISHING ALL PUBLIC SERVICES, AND ESTABLISHING AND TRAINING A TEMPORARY POLICE FORCE. THE AGREEMENT IMPLIES THAT THE THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ENSURING THE RETURN OF PROPERTY THAT HAD BEEN UNLAWFULLY TAKEN, AND ORGANIZING ELECTIONS.

4. (C) THE AGREEMENT ALSO STATES THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION. THE AGREEMENT IMPLIES THAT THIS FORCE WILL HELP IMPLEMENT PROVISIONS REGARDING THE TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION OF THE REGION.

5. (C) THE AGREEMENT REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND TO AUTHORIZE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE. WE SEE TWO BASIC OPTIONS. ONE WOULD BE TO BASE BOTH THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE ON THE CURRENT UNCRO PRESENCE IN CROATIA. THIS WOULD INVOLVE CHANGING UNCRO'S MANDATE TO CORRESPOND TO THAT LAID OUT IN THE NOVEMBER 12 AGREEMENT AND TRANSFORMING THE CURRENT UN CIVILIAN PRESENCE INTO A TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION. THE SECOND OPTION IS TO ESTABLISH BOTH OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE UN FRAMEWORK. THIS OPTION WOULD REQUIRE REPLACING UNCRO BY IFOR OR SOME OTHER INTERNATIONAL COALITION. WE ASSUME THE PARTIES WOULD ALSO INSIST ON AN ARRANGEMENT PARALLEL TO WHATEVER MODEL IS EVENTUALLY AGREED ON FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA.

6. (C) WE ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO CHOSE BETWEEN THESE MODELS. OUR CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED THAT RAPID COUNCIL ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE NOVEMBER 12 AGREEMENT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT BOTH SIDES FROM BACKSLIDING. THE SECRETARIAT HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE CURRENT UNCRO MANDATE EXPIRES ON NOVEMBER 30 AND THEY WILL HAVE TO PREPARE A REPORT BY THE END OF THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P596

Tue Nov 14 15:08:18 1995

Page 3

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

95 2288537* SCO

PAGE 003
TOR: 141745Z NOV 95

NC 2288537*
USUN N 04545

WEEK CONTAINING RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER THE MANDATE SHOULD BE EXTENDED.

7. (C) BASING THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY ON THE UN'S EXISTING PRESENCE IN CROATIA WOULD ENABLE US TO MOVE QUICKLY TO PUT BOTH IN PLACE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EASTERN SLAVONIA WILL HAVE A MUCH DIFFERENT MANDATE FROM IFOR. THE NOVEMBER 12 AGREEMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE SEPARATION OF FORCES, AND ITS ONLY MILITARY TASK INVOLVES MONITORING DEMILITARIZATION. THE PROVISION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL ASSIST IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD GIVE IT RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, ELECTIONS, AND RETURN OF REFUGEES. NATO HAS REJECTED SUCH TASKS AS PART OF ITS MANDATE IN BOSNIA. FURTHER, DEPLOYING IFOR TO EASTERN SLAVONIA COULD MEAN THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS TO CROATIA AS WELL AS BOSNIA.

8. (C) A NON-UN TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD PRESENT THE SAME ISSUES THAT WE ARE NOW CONFRONTING REGARDING THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA: FINANCING, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE AND THE UN, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SIDES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. IN ADDITION, MANY OF THE CIVILIAN TASKS MENTIONED IN THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING CIVPOL, ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, ARE TASKS THE UN DOES WELL.

9. (C) WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. ADOPT THE POSITION THAT BOTH THE TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE BE UN OPERATIONS. WE WOULD PROCEED AS FOLLOWS: FIRST WE WOULD INTRODUCE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WELCOMING THE AGREEMENT, CALLING ON BOTH SIDES TO COMPLY WITH IT, LAYING OUT THE MANDATE OF BOTH THE TA AND THE IF, AND REQUESTING THE SECRETARIAT TO DRAFT A REPORT WITHIN ONE WEEK DETAILING HOW IT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. UPON RECEIPT OF THE REPORT THE COUNCIL WOULD EITHER ENDORSE OR AMEND THE REPORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL